The consumption landscape is saturated by media messages and media values, as many pessimistic diagnoses of contemporary culture have emphasised. We lack however the tools for understanding the details and the structural forces at work within that landscape, a gap which this paper aims to fill by developing a concept of media and the boundaries and hierarchies that help produce the media's legitimacy. 'Media power' means here the concentration of symbolic power in media institutions, particularly those of television, radio and the press (the common sense definition of 'the media'), although the long-term impact of new media on media power is considered in the paper's conclusion. The central parts of the article discuss, first, the theoretical framework that underlies this approach, which draws by analogy on Durkheim's account of the social generation of the sacred/profane distinction, but also on the work
Introduction
There are many large-scale theories about the consumption landscape and its saturation with media messages and values, from Jean Baudrillard's vision of America as merely 'publicity space', 'space for the image ' (1993: 244) , to Richard Stivers' (1994) diagnosis of America's 'culture of cynicism' in which all distinctions between reality and truth have disappeared in a play of spectacle and performance. But these claims are so general (in spite of being directed at a single object, America) that they give us no insights into what particular consumers do. Surely people make particular directed and self-reflexive journeys across the consumption landscape, and as theorists we too need concepts that will cut into that landscape, so that we can grasp its detailed formations. This is the justification for this article's insistence upon structural categories that on the face of it lie some way from the patterns of consumption, since I will suggest it is precisely such categories that are at work in our everyday experience of a media-saturated consumer culture.
The question of the media's impacts on the wider landscape of consumption has been gaining momentum for some time, and geography, as a discipline, has been central here. If an earlier generation of geographers (Meinig, 1979: 183; Jackson, 1994: viii) lamented the loss of a symbolic landscape based in architecture and place, recent work has explored how media references have created a new symbolic landscape. The 'magic' of mediated place encompasses shopping malls (Kowinski, 1985; Hopkins, 1990; Langman, 1992) and theme parks, particularly those which are sites of current or historical media production (Davis, 1996; Gottdiener, 1997; Couldry, 2000: Part Two) , hence Sharon Zukin's claim that DisneyWorld's architecture matters 'not because it is a symbol of capitalism, but because it is the capital of symbolism' (Zukin, 1991: 232) . Rather than reduce this new landscape to an extension of the audience's supposed passivity before television (Sack, 1992, chapter 5) , it is more useful to attend to its details, and the divisions and hierarchies that structure them; in short, to take seriously the idea that it is a 'landscape of power' (Zukin, 1991) , with all the complexity that implies.
I want to examine some key concepts for grasping the mediated consumer landscape, and its fault-lines: in particular, 'media power', and the categorical distinction between 'media' and 'ordinary' (things, people, events) that underlies it. There is indeed a symbolic dimension to the power relation between media consumers and producers; and, like the fault-line of class which Sennett and Cobb (1972) eloquently analysed three decades ago, it brings its own hidden injuries.
The term 'hidden injuries' may seem surprising in relation to media power, in particular the power of popular media, and I will explain this point further below. For now, let me explain that the hidden injuries I discuss (like those of class) concern personal value, but they are linked to the media-related frameworks through which we perceive the social world as a whole. Those frameworks span the media's factual/fictional dimensions, and implicitly connect the consumer's space which is paradigmatically private and political space which is paradigmatically public. This has wider implications, to which I return in the conclusion.
To study media at this general, almost ecological, level is to rework a question Lazarsfeld and Merton (1969) [1948] raised about 'media effects'. Although many of their original questions about media effects have been superseded, at least in the form in which they posed them, their first question remains important, and surprisingly neglected: what are 'the effects of the existence of . . . media in our society ' (1969: 495) ? But in spite of some suggestive comments, they concluded that, given the impossibility of comparative 'control' studies of societies without mass
Theoretical framework
The television theorist John Corner has written that 'the conception of "power" within a notion of televisual process has now become a matter of the utmost importance and difficulty ' (1997: 258) . The same might be said of 'power' within the media process more generally. There is a tension between appreciating the variable contents and contexts of daily media consumption and yet maintaining our grip on the society-wide issue of media power. I am interested less in how media contents reflect external pressures (ideological, economic, statist, and so on) than in how media affect social ontology: what kinds of things become 'social facts' and 'social realities'?
How do media affect the categorisations which enable us to order the social world as a structured space, or landscape, at all?
An Analogy from Durkheim
Any theorisation of the media's social impacts must start from their privileged role in framing our experiences of the social, and thereby defining what the 'reality' of our society is. Roger Silverstone (1988; cf Couldry, 2000: 42-44) has analysed how television is a ritual 'frame': a cognitive, imaginative, and practical space through which everyone can access simultaneously the things that mark off the 'social' -what is shared by everyone -from the private and particular. This analysis, which I would argue captures something fundamental about not just television but also radio and to some extent the press, derives in part from an analogy with Durkheim's theory (1995) [1912] of how religion's pervasive distinction between 'sacred' and 'profane' is socially generated. Crucial here is Durkheim's underlying distinction between social experience and ordinary experience, the force of which, he argues, grounds the sacred/profane distinction itself. This force derives from the individual's awe in the presence of the 'social ' (1995: 208-25 ).
Durkheim's account relates specifically to the sense of the sacred in a particular nomadic Aboriginal society which he describes as coming together only occasionally for ritual occasions focussed around totemic objects, but his description of the totemic object's power is still highly suggestive for an analysis of television:
Imputing the emotions [of the social] to the image is all the more natural because being common to the group, they can only be related to a thing that is equally common to all.
Only the totemic emblem meets this condition. By definition, it is common to all. During the ceremony, all eyes are upon it. Although the generations change, the image remains the same. It is the abiding element of social life.
(1995: 222, emphasis added) Analogously -and this is only an analogy, as I explain later -in a society of almost universal television consumption, and largely shared patterns of programme availability, 2 the simple fact that television is 'by definition common to all' itself grounds its function as a frame for the social. Television's 'authority depends on its continual presence' (Silverstone 1983: 150) . This function has over time been reinforced by many 'media events' (Dayan and Katz, 1992) when television has performed that framing role quite explicitly (major sports events, royal ceremonial, political crises), but it is not only a dimension of exceptional media events; it is inherent to the media's permanent position as the frame through which private worlds face the social.
It is artificial here to separate television from other mass media: radio and the press (compare my broad 'common sense' definition of 'the media' above). First of all, while these media vary in the degree to which they have 'mass' audiences (and if the press has always had a segmented readership (Abercrombie, 1996: 153) the same is increasingly true of television and radio), all these media, in any case, interpenetrate in consumption, referring to each other in a web of significance. Second, I am arguing that, over and above the detailed differences between these media, we have a sense of 'the media' which relates to the underlying functional position of media in society as the 'frame' through which we (as private citizens) access the social. The phrase 'the media', in this sense, while it maps onto the broad institutional sphere that links television, radio and the press, is a constructed term, that operates by contrast to another constructed term, 'the ordinary' (that is, the part of the social world that is not 'in' the media). It is this categorical distinction between 'media' (person, thing, world) and 'ordinary' (person, thing, world) that is at the root of media institutions' power, and the hidden injuries to which I suggest that power gives rise.
At this level also it is misleading to separate the media's fictional and news contents (whatever the importance of doing so in other contexts, for example in genre analysis), because both derive their status from the media's special symbolic authority (Couldry, 2000: 51-52) . Joshua
Meyrowitz has put this point well:
[Fictional] programmes are massive, shared experiences that everyone perceives as massive shared experiences. Through such conscious sharing, they come to seem as real as -sometimes more real than -the varied and less shared experiences of our individual lives. (1992: 466) The significance of this apparently merely definitional point is clear, if 'most people watch fiction [rather than news] on television most of the time' (Morley, 1999: 139) . The implication is not that we should downplay questions about the factual accuracy of television, but that we should investigate how television's authority is reproduced across both news and fiction, and in the blurring of the two.
The media's 'framing' function connects with another argument, about the categorisation, or the 'ordering', of the social world (Couldry, 2000: 44-50) , which I have already touched upon in explaining the particular way in which I am using the term 'the media'. Important here, once again, is Durkheim's theory of the social origins of religion: particularly his account of the 'sacred'/'profane' distinction (1995: 33-9) . It is not that the media are literally 'sacred'. Rather, the sacred/profane distinction is a useful structural analogue for a different distinction: between 'media world' and 'ordinary world'. This latter distinction is particularly important in naturalising the media's concentration of symbolic power.
What distinguishes the division between 'sacred' and 'profane' according to Durkheim is not content ('anything . . . can be sacred ', 1995: 35) nor its use to rank objects and people (there are many rankings whose significance is less profound), but simply the fact that the division is 'absolute': 'the sacred and the profane are always and everywhere conceived by the human intellect as separate genera, as two worlds with nothing in common'. The division divides 'the world into two domains, one containing all that is sacred and the other all that is profane'; hence maintaining this division requires in practice a general separation of sacred and profane things (1995: 36, 34, 38) . As we will see, there is a structural parallel between these points and the media case. points. Just as the hierarchical distinction between sacred and profane is (according to Durkheim) grounded in the way the social is framed in a sacred context, so too the framing of the social through a media context is what grounds a pervasive, and I suggest hierarchical distinction between 'media world' (everything associated with the media process) and 'ordinary world' (everything outside it). It is this categorical distinction that underlies, I suggest, our sense of media power as both 'natural' and legitimate.
I will come back to the question of hierarchy in a moment and seek to justify it further through my empirical examples. First, however, let me emphasise that, while we can develop an analogy from Durkheim that helps us capture the depth of the media's power, and its roots in the organisation of social experience itself, it is equally important to see the limits of any Durkheimian model of media power. The media/ordinary distinction is not a 'social fact' in the Durkheimian sense: it is not beyond contestation. Although it operates as if absolute, it is constructed, not natural. It cuts across and reshapes social reality, mystifying the process of media production as a world somehow 'apart' and reifying the vast sector of social life outside media production as a so-called 'ordinary' domain. It also masks the complexities of media production processes themselves. And above all, it disguises, and therefore helps naturalise, the far from natural inequality of symbolic power from which the complex institutional sphere of the media benefits.
This gap -3 between the enormous rhetorical reach of media representations (their claims about the social 'whole') and the partial reality which the media process itself comprises -is one way we can approach this article's title: the 'hidden injuries of media power'. For if our sense of 'the media' (as the source of truths about the social) is based on an overvaluation of the media's status, then our sense of 'the ordinary' (the ordinary world, the ordinary person) is based on an undervaluation: a pervasive devaluation of the ordinary as a site of meaning and value. This might seem paradoxical in an age of reality television (on which more below), until we recall that it is mediated versions of the ordinary that generally have our attention, not the sphere of the 'ordinary' proper that lies in the shadow of the media's operations, and which is my main concern.
If my argument is correct -and it is of course a broad hypothesis, for which I have space to provide only limited evidence here -then it becomes plausible to speak about media power (and the hierarchical distinctions which sustain it) not just as an inequality of resources, but also as a source of 'injury': an injury connected with the pervasive misrecognition of everyday life as 'merely' ordinary (not, that is, touched by the 'glamour' of mediation). The idea of media power's 'hidden injuries' draws, then, on Bourdieu's concept of 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu, 1991: 209-212) , that is, an inequality imposed not by force, but by consent: consent based on a misrecognition of the social world as already structured to 'fit' that inequality.
Bourdieu himself does not use the term 'hidden injuries' of course, which I take from Sennett This at least is my hypothesis but, to develop it, I need to look more closely at how our beliefs about the media are reproduced in practice. We affirm media's power at a distance, not because media actually bring us together, but because they construct themselves, and we construct them, as if they did. As many recent theories of power 4 have suggested, media power, for all its basis in institutional brute facts (including profound inequalities of access to the means of media production), is sustained in a dispersed way, through our beliefs and patterns of thought about media institutions. They not only evidence the fact that we lend legitimacy to media institutions; they are part of the process through which that legitimacy is sustained, and it is this process in particular on which I want to cast some light.
A Research Strategy
How can we research those beliefs and patterns of thought, the culture of media belief? How can we research the subset of beliefs which sustain the media/ordinary distinction and hierarchy, that I have suggested underlies both media power and the mediated landscape of everyday consumption? A good entry-point is situations where non-media people and media institutions meet close up, and non-media people's talk and beliefs about such situations. You might object that the whole point about the media, as institutions of broadcasting, is that such moments are rare: the media are precisely communication at a distance. But just because a social process is rare does not mean that it is insignificant. Indeed the fact that non-media people rarely do have free access to media people may itself reveal something about the power disparity between those two groups, or at least its sources. To take a broader analogy from the study of religion, the fact that many ritual experiences (such as pilgrimage, communion) are rare or ritually controlled, does not make them any less worth studying. On the contrary, such ritual interactions, when they occur, tell us a lot about how the social power of religious institutions is more widely reproduced.
If people's general attitudes to the media are shaped by their normal separation from the process of media production, then their accounts of what happens when (rarely) they see that process close up may bring to the surface precisely the assumptions about media -the background expectations and judgements which normally remain unarticulated -that interest us. This, broadly speaking, was how Harold Garfinkel sought to analyse the 'background expectancies' at work in everyday social interaction by studying what happens when those expectancies are breached (Garfinkel, 1984: ch. 1) . Let me now pursue this possibility in more detail.
On the Track of Media Beliefs
In this section, I want to introduce some empirical material on media consumption, that does not come from the places where we normally look for evidence of our relationship to the media. It Note that John's sense that the Coronation Street set, and nothing else, is worth visiting co-exists with his knowing that it is only a set and that others regard it as such. This knowingness fits uneasily with the apparent postmodern truth, wittily expressed by Umberto Eco, that we live in a world in which the 'completely real' is identified with the 'completely fake' (Eco, 1986 : 7, quoted Rojek, 1993 . At the same time, there is a sense of 'aura' in John's comment: aura in Benjamin's broad sense (1968), yet not the aura of something outside the mechanical reproduction of filming, but the aura of the place and process of filming itself. This was present in many other comments by visitors, for example:
It's magic, it's a great feeling, sitting at home when you watch telly and say I was there! To think you could do that. (woman interviewed on site, original emphasis)
We need to unpack this sense of aura a little, and I can describe only a few of its interesting implications. One is the possibility that the set works as a place for ritual performance. Here is how Michael, an Irish fan of the programme, with whom I corresponded, described being on the set (he had visited two times, and was planning to return): Or here is John again, describing his sense that he didn't want to enter the buildings on the set (in fact, you can not, which disappointed many other visitors!):
I didn't think for one minute that I'd be able to get in (. . .) I actually felt privileged just to turn the knob and try to get in [to the Rovers Return pub] (. . .) No, no, it was just brilliant to be photographed outside it. 5 Specific to this sense of ritual performance is a sense of a ritual boundary, embodied in the set and the basis of its ritual status. The boundary in question is that between the world in which visitors usually operate (the 'ordinary world') and the world the set inhabits, the 'media world'. However small and 'ordinary' the action, it would be significant, if it meant having once entered the 'media world'. Even doing something ordinary on television (like 'ordering a paper'), however brief, makes a difference. And when Peter did finally appear on television on a talk show, he felt that he had changed in some way:
Totally different now from the way I used to be (. . .) I was so quiet, I never dreamed of Patricia Priest's important study of US talk show participants (Priest 1995 (Priest , 1996 cf Gamson, 1998 ) points in the same direction. Her interviewees commented on the reactions of other people once they had appeared on television: even if they were identified with a group facing public hostility, they met positive responses, simply because they had appeared on television. While 'ordinary viewers' do appear on television -indeed daytime talk shows and evening 'reality TV' are full of them -it is the normal impossibility of appearing that matters more at the level of people's 'dispositions' (Bourdieu, 1977) . As one US talk show participant said: 'I guess the average American doesn't think they could ever get on a talk show' (quoted, Priest, 1996: 71). Debbie's experience of herself being on a talk show (as part of the studio audience for the popular UK daytime talk show Kilroy) is significant here. In recounting it, she dwelt more on the experience of watching a videotape of the programme back home, than on being on the programme itself. Watching the tape shocked her:
I thought, God, that's me, I'm on telly. God, that is so strange [short laugh] (. . .) I couldn't remember sort of like . . . being there, it just didn't seem the same watching it on telly, it was totally different (. . .) Or it's not like telly, it's like a sort of home video that someone's brought round that's done on a camcorder. You think, God, is that really on the telly? Is there millions of people watching it? Don't know, I honestly had to tape over it in the end, because it was making me cringe.
Debbie could not make a credible connection between the two states (being on television and being at home). She could no longer effectively recall what it felt like to 'be there' on television.
She started to doubt the status of the recording: was it just a piece of 'home video' (made entirely outside the media world)? In destroying her best evidence of ever crossing the boundary between her world and the media world -something which elsewhere she made clear she wanted to doDebbie registered the dislocation caused by the absolute boundary between her 'world' (the world of 'home video') and the 'media world' (the world which 'millions' watch).
'Her picture in the paper, but her on the corner'
I want to turn now to the situations of 'witnessing' mentioned earlier, where people involuntarily come up close to the media process. I researched, in particular, people's experience of protests which were featured in media coverage, situations far removed from media consumption it might seem, but striking for how they consolidate the picture of the mediated symbolic landscape we gained from Granada Studios Tour. I will concentrate on interviews conducted with people who had protested at Brightlingsea, one of a number of British ports whose protests combined to make live exports of veal calves and lambs a major issue in the British news agenda in 1995.
Note that I am deliberately abstracting from the detailed issues of that protest to concentrate on participants' reflections on their relation to the protests' intense media coverage. images'. 7 Journalists, camera crews, press photographers, satellite transmission dishes -all the trappings of media production on location -were there. Protesters as non-media people were interacting directly with media institutions (or at least their representatives). The shock of seeing face-to-face the media process -and realising the gap between media coverage (that of a previously trusted 'window onto the world') and their own direct experience of the protestsencouraged many to reflect on their earlier attitudes to the media.
I want to concentrate on my interview with Rachel, a social services worker in her early 40s. Like many others at Brightlingsea, Rachel reported that she had lost her trust in the media:
[author:] What effect do you think it had on you, being so close to the media? (. . .)
[Rachel:] I think it completely took away . . . any awe that I may have had . . . respect isn't the right word. Rachel's reflections back beyond the time of the protests to her previous attitudes to the media are striking. Previously she had felt more than respect for the media: she had felt 'awe', expressed in her sense of 'media people' as 'big people'. 'Awe' is a strong word to use, but it is consistent with her analysis of her likely previous reaction to appearing in the media: either avoiding the media through nervousness, or 'pushing herself' and 'telling them what [she] really thought'. Either way, as she sees, she would have been acknowledging a sense of the boundary which media participation involves: 'it was still with that sort of feeling, "Ooh, these big people have come from the television!"'.
That sense of a boundary between 'media' and 'ordinary' worlds is another version of the boundary we found in people's reflections on visiting Granada Studios Tour. The implied barrier between an 'ordinary person' and the media process emerged elsewhere in an interview with another animal rights campaigner, Louise, who began using a camcorder to film maltreatment of animals at a local livestock market. A phrase of Louise's summed up her feeling of the shift her involvement in media-related protests represented for herself and others:
It's all changed. We're just ordinary people with no experience of the media or protests or anything. (added emphasis)
For Louise, implicitly, being an 'ordinary person' meant having no experience of the media (or as Rachel put it, 'television's all exciting and it happens to other people').
Perhaps the most vivid sense of that boundary , and its materiality, came when Rachel described how during the protests she saw outside her bedroom window the local 'lollipop lady' 8 surrounded by police for no apparent reason, and then saw a similar photo of her in the UK daily newspaper The Independent:
And Sandra the lollipop lady who speaks to us every day and remembers my kids' names and everything, is totally surrounded by uniformed police officers, and she'd done nothing, she was standing on the kerb, and it was just so bizarre that Sandra was in the paper (. . .) I can't even describe how utterly inappropriate it was. Because Sandra stands down there, Sandra Jones with her lollipop.
[original emphasis]
Rachel had felt genuine anxiety at Sandra's situation, yet something else breaks through: the sense of shock that the 'ordinary world' Rachel inhabited was temporarily part of the 'media world', which everyone in the country could see. Compare Rachel's description of seeing her friend's husband in the paper:
And the other picture was again so very very poignant and . What Rachel 'can't describe' is the temporary fusion of 'ordinary' and 'media' worlds that overrides the normally naturalised boundary between 'ordinary' and 'media' worlds. The shock of this -its 'impossibility' -is expressed precisely in the insistent banality of the language (Couldry, 2000: 104-105, 196-198; cf Billig, 1997: 225) : it was 'just Geoffrey', 'just normal', 'just two', 'very very very very normal'. Yet paradoxically this 'ordinary world' had become mediated, creating a gap which was strange: 'her picture in the paper, but her on the corner'. In that small word 'but', the division between media and ordinary worlds is expressed in a naturalised, and therefore uncontestable, form
It is time now to review the wider implications of this interview material and of the research strategy in the course of which they emerged.
Wider Implications
In examining media power, and the hierarchy and boundaries which help legitimate it, it has been necessary in the last two sections to focus on the details, first, of the theoretical framework with which I am working and, second, of how traces of such large-scale patterns can be found in empirical evidence of people's reflections on their encounters with the media process. In concluding, I want to widen my focus considerably and indicate a range of debates where it is helpful to pay attention to the forces that structure the mediated symbolic landscape (which is not detached from, but closely overlaps with, the general landscape of everyday consumption).
There is, I have argued, a boundary, regularly legitimated and symbolically effective, between 'media world' and 'ordinary' (that is, non-media) 'world', a boundary which is 'absolute' in Durkheim's sense, so that any crossing of it, or even approach to it, is automatically significant.
It is because we stand in such a relationship to the media world, that Cecelia Tichi's apparent statement of fact rings true: 'to be transposed onto television is to be elevated out of the banal realm of the off-screen and repositioned in the privileged on-screen world ' ( : 140, quoted Priest, 1996 . This boundary condenses a categorical difference which is not simply optional -something we can think with, if we want -but compulsory, or at least usually compulsory, since naturalised, unless we explicitly work to deconstruct it. As a constructed boundary, it operates to distort the actual complexities of the media process. Of course, in practice, media production draws its personnel and its themes very often from 'ordinary' life, but that does not underline the media/ordinary boundary, on the contrary it is what makes it all the more compelling as the frame through which ('ordinary') social life becomes glamorous by virtue of being mediated. As with all social constructions, the reality underlying the arbitrariness of the construction is messy. That gap, which the constructed authority of the media/ordinary boundary bridges, may be painful at times, as we have seen. Yet our belief in the legitimacy of that boundary (a belief that is odd, when stated so baldly, which is why it rarely is stated so baldly) is the basis of what I have called the 'hidden injuries of media power'.
If this argument -bold and in some respects speculative as it is -is accepted, then it can help us grasp better various areas of contemporary cultural consumption. First, there is the space of celebrity and fandom, in particular the seemingly endless reinscription of the media/ordinary boundary in new media forms, including the 'ordinary' celebrity who appears to transcend the media/ordinary boundary in a move which generally just reinforces its legitimacy: television games such as Big Brother, as played in many countries in 2000 are a good example (Couldry, forthcoming) . Second, there is the phenomenon of 'participatory' media, which claim legitimacy from their inclusion of 'ordinary people who watch television': 9 talk shows and all forms of 'reality TV' from those which simply show clips of surveillance footage (traffic accidents, and so on) to highly crafted docusoaps organised around a theme from everyday life (in the UK, recent examples would be Hotel, Driving School, and Airport). Underlying all such programmes is a fascinating question, which is why people wish to participate in them, in spite of often significant costs. How the media/ordinary boundary is negotiated varies greatly between these types of programme, of course, but rarely, I would contend, is it de-naturalised or called into question.
More broadly, the idea that the media put us 'in touch' with the 'larger' world (the other side of the 'merely' 'ordinary' world in which we live) structures many consumer phenomena, from the growth in media-related tourism (such as GST in Britain and Universal Studios in America) to the media-saturated rhetoric of large-scale commercial events. We can hear that rhetoric in comments on Vancouver's Expo 86, where one visitor spoke of 'the wonderful line-ups which enabled me to meet the world' and another reflected that 'remembering the time I sang with my friends in front of the world live in a studio was something extraordinary for me' (quotes from Ley and Olds, 1992: 188, 190 , emphasis added). The symbolic landscape which the media imply is a dimension of our 'sensuous geographies' (Rodaway, 1994) , which has been insufficiently studied.
My argument throughout, however, has been that we must do more than describe the surfaces of the symbolic landscape that media have generated, important though that is. As sociologists concerned with power and the naturalisation of inequality, we need to think about the impacts of the inequalities built into that landscape and entrenched in the media/ordinary distinction.
Underlying his rhetorical excess, Baudrillard's enduring insight may be to have seen that media institute 'a separation . . . a social division' (Baudrillard, 1981: 128) .To put it crudely, why else would the transition to celebrity (and the games played in celebrity's border zones) matter so much?
An important qualification is however necessary to my overall argument. I am not saying that the media/ordinary boundary is simply reproduced everywhere and evenly (without any possibility of ever being de-naturalised) or denying that there are many ways of living with that boundary, just as there are with any other social division. We can play with the boundary, imagining we have transgressed it (for example, by 'real life' actions that pretend to work within the space of media fictions: people who send flowers when a soap opera character dies). 10 We can fantasise about crossing that boundary (Couldry, 2000: 55-57) . We can be ironic or mocking about the boundary.
All these are ways of negotiating distance from the media/ordinary boundary, that at the same time reinstitute it (Bourdieu, 1991: 89-91) . As Slavoj Zizek (1989: 33) has argued -and this point has been neglected in accounts of the 'fluidity' of the postmodern -'even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them', that is, still reproducing the form of the division we claim to mock. There are many ways, as Bourdieu puts it, of 'loving the inevitable ' (1977: 77) .
In any case, mediation is only one dimension of social reality; it is not its totality and as sociologists we must always insist upon this, even as we recognise that it is precisely the media's claim to represent the social whole that is the basis of their power. Behind that totalising claim, there are many important distinctions which we need to explore further. First, there are the barely explored differences in territories' cultures of media belief, each territory having its own history of relations between state, market, religion, and media. Media power is not the same thing in America, Russia, Singapore or the UK and, if we pretend it is, we obscure from view a potentially rich field of comparative research. Second, it remains unclear how new media and the digital convergence of media will affect media power: will it lead to its gradual dispersal across a flattened landscape of interconnected consumer/producers, or will it only serve in the long run to entrench the symbolic power of a new digital 'supermedium' (Castells, 1996: 358-64) ? Will 'narrowcasting' become the dominant, not merely a subsidiary feature of the media landscape?
As yet we do not know (cf Neuman, 1991) . Certainly, in relation to the Internet for example, we need to distinguish the open-ended complexity of Internet practices from the forces which are already consolidating 'the Internet' (Miller and Slater, 2000: 16) .
Finally, and in case we are tempted to dismiss this whole area of research as simply repeating a banal truth that the media are central to our lives, it is worth emphasising that it is precisely the banality of this truth that makes it difficult for us to see it clearly, and still more difficult for us to contest. The banality of media power, and our beliefs which sustain it, have recently been reflected, if only in reverse, by a striking case where they were contested. People have recently begun to contest the media-enhanced elision of political space with consumption space (Giroux, 1999 (Giroux, , 2000 in surprising ways. Think of the wide resonance which Naomi Klein's No Logo (2000) has had, even if that book oversimplifies the politics of today's consumption landscape (Hanspal and McRobbie, 2000) . As Alberto Melucci, a leading analyst of the changing forms of symbolic conflict (Melucci, 1989 (Melucci, , 1996 , has put it, only partly exaggerating: 'the real domination is today the exclusion from the power of naming ' (1996: 179) , that is, naming social reality in words, and of course images, which command attention. Such domination cannot simply pass without being contested at some level and Melucci's insight, far from being banal, may be exactly the incitement we need to grasp the world of media consumption, and consumption more generally, not just as playful surface, but as a true landscape of power whose contours and fissures we have yet to track.
